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‘The relationship of canon and messiah: The convergence of Jan Assmann and Walter Benjamin on a 
theory of monotheistic canon’ 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper focuses upon the relationship between the German Egyptologist Jan Assmann and the 
German-Jewish late modern literary critic Walter Benjamin as regards the movement from canons to 
messianic forces.  It therefore traces the evolution  in Assmann’s thought from issues surrounding the 
processes of canonization to his development of a form of ‘weak thought’ in relation to religious violence 
before then turning to Benjamin’s portrayal of a ‘weak messianic force’ moving through history which is 
only conceivable in close proximity to a scriptural legacy and a divine (or ‘pure’) violence, as he saw it.  
Additionally, this essay draws a line connecting the work of each in order to solidify the structure and 
function of the monotheistic canon as being not only at the heart of western civilization, but also at the 
heart of all cultural transmissions today.  That is, the formal elements at work in the canonical-messianic 
relationship are universally applicable for all identity formation of modern subjectivities, whether 
political, cultural or religious, insofar as the entire realm of representations appears to be governed by a 
canonical sense of normativity.  A closer inspection then of how these elements were brought together in 
their original religious context might therefore better enable us to discern the effects which canons have 
upon the construction of identities in a globalized world today. 
 
Introduction 
 
 We live in a world often described paradoxically as a ‘globalized fragmentation’ of traditional 
forms and identities, one that is prone to a ‘clash of civilizations’ that has seemingly provoked both the 
proliferation of new hybrid cultures and a simultaneous deep retreat into the apparent safety of communal 
boundaries (Huntington 1998).  Though these opposed poles of tradition and hybridity are commonly 
expressed through their fundamental embodied forms (e.g. religious, ethnic, national identities), there are 
also a plethora of other mediating factors (e.g. economic, social, political, geographical ones) which often 
cloud and obscure the real tensions at stake in such a juxtaposition of the multiple views present in our 
world today.  These trends of a globalized fragmentation in turn give rise to re-formulations of how we 
understand the common space we call the ‘political’, as well as what types of subjects are constructed 
within it (Bhabha 1994; Niezen 2004). 
 In what follows, I intend to illustrate how a significant re-framing of this contemporary context of 
globalized fragmentation, one centered on a conceptualization of its disintegrating ‘canonical’ forms, can 
assist our analysis of the present ‘identity crisis’ we face and provide tools by which to assess the 
religious implications of identity formation in particular.  This analysis is a bid then to take up once again 
the debate upon the ‘conflict of canons’ and the associated representations each canon engenders, while 
yet advancing this debate in new directions through an historical re-situating of its terms (Brenneman 
1997).  In this sense, we might be able to see more clearly what is at stake in the contestations for political 
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and cultural intelligibility, the very foundations in fact of how we understand contemporary constructions 
of (very often competing) subjectivities.   
Indeed, these are subjectivities as well which are necessary for establishing cultural intelligibility, 
and yet they are never fully able to historically totalize (i.e. eternally affix) their meaning once and for all.  
They rather evolve and change over time; they move with the people and are subject to a myriad of re-
readings and reinterpretations.  They are also, more often than not, ‘opened up’ by elements working at 
them from within, exceptions to the general norms that cannot be properly assimilated and which 
eventually end up undoing the canonical representations that have come to define our (globalized) world.  
These are the recently much championed ‘messianic’ elements of justice said to work behind any 
canonical claim, broadening their definitions in order to bring public recognition to the claims of 
otherwise marginalized identities.  By this reasoning, a line is opened up between the canonical norms 
which govern social representations and their accompanying ‘messianic’ elements which eventually seek 
to loosen the violence they perform.
1
   
 Indeed, this process of reforming canonical norms is reflected in a contemporary ethical discourse 
on ‘messianic’ rights and the call for justice to be enacted over and against the rule of law (de Vries 2002; 
Žižek 2008; Santner 2006).  Here, a secular-ethical discourse forms itself in reliance upon a deeply 
informed religious (monotheistic and, hence, canonical) traditional terminology.  Hence, any talk of the 
‘messianic’ becomes central in constructing such a worldview.  We would be rightly legitimated then in 
asking to what degree this co-opting of a religious terminology is justified in this context, whether in fact 
something of the monotheistic canon remains embedded within these discourses from which the term 
‘messianic’ clearly descends and how we are to understand the general structure of (religious) experience 
opened up through these reflections.  By doing so, and as I intend to do in what follows, we might 
actually be able to offer some insight into the alleged ‘clash of civilizations’ taking place today, often 
occurring under the heavy sway of religious influence (Juergensmeyer 2003, 2005). 
 These introductory meditations on our current context of the conflict of global canons of political, 
social, cultural and religious representations are intended to point toward the nature of the canonical form 
itself, something first formalized with the beginnings of biblical scripture, and its relation to its own 
inherent de-stabilizing elements, those marked under the sign of the ‘messianic’.  In the historical and 
critical analysis of two contemporary authors that follows, I intend to briefly sketch the interrelation of 
these concepts as they move through their work from their earliest origins (in the formulation and 
promulgation of the monotheistic canon, the first real cultural canon of its kind) to their relevance in late 
modernity, on the heels of a cultural catastrophe in terms of identity.  To do this, I will be utilizing two 
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 These ‘messianic’ themes of legal reformulations for an increased bid for justice, and thus a possible ‘non-
violence’, can be found, for example, prominently on the rise in theorist such as Judith Butler (Butler 2009).   
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seemingly, at first glance, distant discourses, those of the German Egyptologist Jan Assmann and the 
German-Jewish late modern literary critic Walter Benjamin.  By restricting ourselves to the interrelation 
between their work, I hope to demonstrate, not only the close theoretical proximity between their 
thoughts, but also the importance and prominence which the procedures guiding the usage of a 
monotheistic canon have for today.  In this sense, I will begin by tracing the evolution  in Assmann’s 
thought from issues surrounding the processes of canonization to his development of a form of ‘weak 
thought’ in relation to religious violence.  I will then, relatedly, turn to Benjamin’s portrayal of a ‘weak 
messianic force’ moving through history which is only conceivable in close proximity to a scriptural 
legacy and a divine (or ‘pure’) violence, as he saw it.  In essence, then, I will show how Assmann’s work 
has moved naturally from the canonical, and in order to more fully justify his claims on the canonical, to 
the messianic, shortly before demonstrating how Benjamin’s chronologically prior work moves from the 
messianic to the canonical, a point which has not yet fully surfaced within contemporary Benjamin 
scholarship.   
I am therefore seeking in this essay to draw a line connecting the work of each in order to solidify 
the structure and function of the monotheistic canon as being not only at the heart of western civilization, 
but also at the heart of all cultural transmissions today.  That is, the formal elements at work in the 
canonical-messianic relationship are universally applicable for all identity formation of modern 
subjectivities, whether political, cultural or religious, insofar as the entire realm of representations appears 
to be governed by a canonical sense of normativity.  A closer inspection then of how these elements were 
brought together in their original religious context might therefore better enable us to discern the effects 
which canons have upon the construction of identities in a globalized world today.   
 
Jan Assmann on the monotheistic canon and the ‘Mosaic distinction’ 
 
The work of contemporary Egyptologist Jan Assmann has run over a breadth of ideas throughout 
the course of a long and ongoing career.  Throughout it, he has focused mainly on an analysis of the 
polytheistic beliefs of ancient Egypt as well as the processes of a monotheistic canonization that 
juxtaposed itself over against Egyptian polytheism (Assmann 1993, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2006a, 2006b, 
2008, 2010; Assmann and Assmann, 1987).  In the past several years, however, Assmann’s work has 
begun to address the roots of monotheistic belief in a rather profound manner, merging the work of Freud 
on Moses and monotheism with the signifying function of the canon in general cultural terms, that is, the 
canon’s ability to determine meaning and value within a given society.  This has led him, in turn, to shed 
light on the relationship between monotheism, with its canon of revealed writings, and polytheism, with 
its emphasis on an oral culture.  His work has also provoked a good deal of critical attention since his 
4 
 
depiction of the monotheistic canon as a unique source of religious violence has seemed to some to be an 
unfair linkage.  These criticisms have subsequently moved Assmann to devote a number of studies to 
ascertaining more precisely the relationship between the formation of canons in general, their role in 
shaping a monotheistic worldview and what lies at the core of religious violence.
2
  These studies have 
taken him through a path that would ultimately lead toward a form of ‘weak (religious) thought’, a type of 
religion that does not claim to be sovereign over others and that in recent years would be familiar to 
several similar lines of thought.
3
 
 The foundations of Assmann’s work are not too difficult or broad to outline.  He begins by 
recognizing the pivotal role which an earlier form of Egyptian monotheism played in shaping the Israelite 
religion.  This was Assmann’s bold foray into theories surrounding Moses’ origin, and it was what gave 
him indeed some recognition in the English-speaking world (Assmann 1998).  Following Freud’s initial 
suspicions, his presupposition that Moses was in fact an Egyptian is what enables him to subsequently 
establish a structural parallel between two central religious concepts: revelation, on the one hand, or that 
which itself is bound by the processes of the canonical (e.g. characterized by remembering, progression 
and a monotheistic or ‘Mosaic’ distinction between true and false) and translation, on the other hand, or 
that which remained more ancient and bound to an oral culture (e.g. characterized by forgetting, 
regression and a polytheistic worldview) (Assmann 1998, 3, 147).
4
  As this tension between revelation 
and translation makes clear, he links revelation and canonization as fundamentally intertwined projects, 
seeing Moses as their historically unifying figure.  That is, the merger of these two religious concepts 
gathers itself under the figure of Moses, therefore rendering mute his actual historical presence.  The 
figure of Moses, then, appears as instrumental in constructing an idea of religion as based upon written 
revelation, and so not just simply the monotheistic ones, according to Assmann, for all written religions 
are ‘…founded on a corpus of canonical writings and thus on a highly authoritative codification of 
memory’.  Hence, ‘the importance of the codification and canonization of memory is linked to the 
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 His Of God and Gods and The Price of Monotheism are works generally conceived in response to criticism of his 
earlier claims.  Some of the point direct criticism was a collection of essay gathered together as an appendix to 
Assmann’s Die Mosaische Unterscheidung oder Der Preis des Monotheismus.  It includes essays by Ralf Rendtorff, 
Klaus Koch, Erich Zenger and Karl-Josef Kuchel. 
3
 Cf. on the work done in relation to Assmann’s theses directly, see Mark S. Smith, The Memoirs of God: History, 
Memory, and the Experience of the Divine in Ancient Israel as well as his God in Translation: Deities in Cross-
Cultural Discourse in the Biblical World.   There are also the similarities which Assmann’s work shares with Regina 
M. Schwartz’s The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism and Ronald Hendel’s Remembering 
Abraham: Culture, Memory, and History in the Hebrew Bible.  In regard to the development of ‘weak thought’, and 
though Assmann himself does not refer to their work, see, among others, John D. Caputo and Gianni Vattimo, After 
the Death of God and John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event for a more sustained 
discussion of the topic. 
4
 Cf. the comments on orality in Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word.  In relation to 
his Freudian point of departure, see Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism; Richard J. Bernstein, Freud and the 
Legacy of Moses; and, James J. DiCensio, The Other Freud: Religion, Culture and Psychoanalysis. 
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structure of the revelation’ (Assmann 2006, 54).  It is, in some sense, as David Halivni has put it, essential 
to the evolution of the monotheistic religions to consider the importance of the entwinement of 
canonization and revelation.
5
 
 In essence, according to Assmann, the Israelite people, once caught within the crisis of an 
immanent invasion and the seemingly inevitable decline of their tradition in exile, were given over to the 
task of revising and canonizing their sacred writings.  This act, in turn, established the hope that this 
process would ensure the survival of the tradition through the ongoing faith practices of the people.  The 
canon would thus be able to provide God with a voice that would be perpetually given over to speak 
God’s word into the looming silence of the future, one that included the possible eradication of their 
culture, at worst, and an exilic living, at best.  As Assmann contends, this desire for the canonical form 
(expressed perhaps best as a desire of ‘canonicity’6) works according to a subsequently developed pattern, 
as the ‘…steps of canonization are…external to the inner dynamics both of tradition and of literary 
transmission.  They come from outside, from the contingencies of history’ (Assmann 2008a, 93).  It is this 
step toward a structural discernment of the canonical form that enables Assmann to provide a unique 
insight into the origins of the monotheistic faith. 
It is in this sense that a canon, unlike anything else history had previously witnessed, could thus 
provide the stability and identity which an exilic life would threaten to undo at any moment, for 
…there is no natural evolutionary path that leads from tradition to text.  The natural path of 
tradition leads toward habituation, toward becoming implicit and even unconscious.  In order to 
become explicit, a tradition has to confront a crisis or even a break.  Impulses to make tradition 
explicit, to record or codify it in textual form, must come from without (Assmann 2008a, 93). 
 
As biblical scholarship has duly attested, and as Assmann views through the lens of the processes of 
canonization, such a force from without was what ancient Israel faced and subsequently dealt with in an 
extraordinarily unique manner.  They were able to distinguish themselves through the creation and 
perpetuation of a canon, both from their neighbors and from their predecessors in Egypt.   
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 This transitional phase toward an ‘extraterritorial nature’ of the Law, as Halivni describes it, is also able to 
underscore a qualitative difference between revelation and canonization, two events now essentially forever 
intertwined: for though ‘Moses received the Torah at Sinai; the people of Israel received a canon in Jerusalem’ 
(Halvini 2001, 85).  This pivotal difference serves as well to highlight their intended relationship as an ideological 
interpretation of the Mosaic event, forever (re)construed for political purposes: ‘The covenant of Sinai was realized 
by means of Ezra’s canonical Torah; thus Ezra’s canon received retroactively a Sinaitic imprimatur’ (85).  The 
legitimacy of the canon was fabricated upon an original revelatory event mired in Mosaic tradition and now 
intricately interlaced with it.  This is to say that even though this historical difference is sufficient to produce a gap 
of some considerable significance, it is the mutual intertwining of the two concepts, and the fabricated proximity 
between them, which was to dissolve any conceptual difference and instead establish a unified sense of ‘sacred 
scripture’. 
6
 The term ‘canonicity’ has received a very limited treatment in theological studies and virtually no notice in 
philosophical ones.  Cf. the limited but relevant handling of the term in Chauvet 1995, 195f. 
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In effect, the process of canonizing a series of disparate traditional texts was a gamble on the part 
of the Israelites to see the tradition extended beyond the decline of a nationalized identity.  It was also, 
however, the form which best suited the newly arisen tone behind the belief in one God, a tone which was 
to see the world divided into its most elemental constituent elements, a rather stark division of all personal 
identities between Jew and non-Jew.  This was the single act, what he terms the ‘Mosaic distinction’, 
which, according to Assmann, strengthened the Jews into a people beyond any national, land-based 
identity.  And it was the ‘eternal’ form of sacred revelation which functioned as the precise tool used in 
order to accomplish this identification.  For Assmann’s part, this is, no doubt, to conceive of the canon as 
a ‘cultural tool’ of sorts as well, certainly as it is based on the transmission and regeneration of certain 
cultural forms.  For this reason, he points out that ‘It is not writing, but the damming up of the stream of 
tradition by the act of canonization that produces the decisive shift from ritual to textual coherence’, and 
which also signaled a ‘fundamental change in cultural continuity’ (Assmann 2006, 41 and 39).  The canon 
had become the ‘tool’ of choice for providing cultural legibility and, owing perhaps to its large success, 
would serve as such ever since. 
The canon, of course, was at the time little more than a simple refinement of the archives and 
literary schools which had been functioning for centuries already (Davies 1998).  Yet, the addition of a 
religious (divine) quality to the text changed the entire way in which both texts and archives were now 
viewed.  Here, the canonical text came to be seen as a ‘combination of the qualities of cultural and sacred 
texts’, stretching itself to encompass the people it identifies, though at the same time providing the norms 
of living which would shape their lives and identifications in diaspora (Assmann 2006, 42).  But it was 
also to do more than this, for  
[w]ith the appearance of writing on the horizon, tradition increases in complexity.  It ceases to be 
based exclusively on memory, but with the assistance of the media of external storage, it also 
acquires new forms of forgetting and re-remembering, of displacement and renewed access, of 
latency and return, of renaissance (100). 
   
Indeed, the then new processes of canonization were to transform the ways in which culture itself was 
understood, the way it can be said to shape its people, from its inception to its even tiniest moment of 
transmission.  As history records, for the Jewish people specifically, the transmission of the text through 
ceaseless acts of commentary was essential for the perpetuation of the tradition throughout time.  This, 
indeed, is what enables Assmann to claim that, ‘…interpretation becomes the central principle of cultural 
coherence and identity’.  And this is so because the ‘normative and formative impulses of cultural 
memory can only be gleaned through the incessant, constantly renewed textual interpretation of the 
tradition through which identity is established’ (43).  The people are brought back to the text again and 
again in an attempt to re-write themselves into the canonical narrative (Boitani 1999).   
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In this way, the canon becomes a quasi-total entity, offering itself as the means by which identity 
is culturally inscribed and recognized.  It identifies the people at the same moment as they identify with it.  
It circumscribes the boundaries of cultural intelligibility and grants a sense of what is possible (the 
‘sayable’) and what is not (the ‘unsayable’).  ‘Ultimately, writing, having been canonized, comes to 
replace art, public life, and tendentially, the world’ (Assmann 2006, 78).  This is the separation from the 
world, as Assmann sees it, that would come to define Judaic tradition forever afterward, and it was the 
beginning of a division that would stake out the basic contours of the monotheistic principle of idolatry, a 
principle certainly in-line with the role of the canon as signifier of meaning and value (and as evidenced 
through the use of the ‘Mosaic distinction’).7  Indeed, this is the same principle which would posit itself 
as a mark of its ‘non-translatability’, a trait which renders canons less fluid in their movement from one 
culture to another, causing them indeed to be firmly rooted in a religious or national context (Assmann 
2008b).   
  
A ‘weak notion of truth’ 
 
In general, scholars receiving these initial claims on the nature of canons formulated in 
Assmann’s work, both from a religious perspective and from without, have not found too much cause for 
criticism (Smith 2004; Schwartz 1998).  It is rather when Assmann begins to draw conclusions on the 
relationship between these claims and violence (its either being inherent to it, which he at times seems to 
indicate, or that it is a perversion of the original intent, as he later tries to clarify) that he begins to run into 
firm critiques as such.  The reasons for this (mis)understanding could perhaps be summarized as follows.   
In short, Assmann will attempt to incorporate the ‘messianic’ into his account of the canonical 
form as his work increasingly came under fire for its seemingly inherent linkage of monotheism and 
violence.  Assmann’s introduction of the ‘Mosaic distinction’, as the polarized division of the world into 
two camps, the righteous and the wicked, the faithful and the idolaters, and hence as the defining 
characteristic of canonical thought, brought him before a torrent of both critical reception and harsh 
dismissal.  Indeed, his presentation of the monotheistic canon, which seemed at times to aim only toward 
its dissolution in favor of a more polytheistic worldview, even provoked then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, 
now Pope Benedict XVI, to respond in kind to these charges (Ratzinger 2004, 210-230).  In response, 
Assmann’s latest work has offered more of a conciliatory role toward the monotheistic canons of 
scripture.  He is attempting thus to further clarify his position and trying to draw attention to the 
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 If the canon can be said to function as a signifier of sorts, separating believers from idolaters, it yet performs this 
division on a ‘sliding scale’, one that can be said to both fluxuate over time and at times provide a critique of itself, 
something pursued here under the rubric of messianicity.  Cf. the conclusion to Halbertal and Margalit’s Idolatry. 
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‘nonviolent’ core of monotheism which lies latent under its historical manifestations.  This is what allows 
him, in the conclusion of his latest work, Of God and Gods, to state that ‘The power of religion rests on 
nonviolence.  Only through a complete rejection of violence is monotheism able to fulfill its liberating 
mission of forming an alternative counterpower to the totalizing claims of the political’ (Assmann 2008a, 
145). 
 This was to be a clarification much needed in response to both his critics and allies alike, for his 
position had often been misread as advocating a return to some form of a primordial polytheistic 
worldview.
8
  To counter this caricature, he carefully elaborates his position by stating that he is  
not suggesting that one return to “Egypt,” to the polytheistic system of mutual translatability and 
recognition, but rather that one step forward toward a religion that clings to the idea of the unity 
of God and commits itself to the moral commandments, while at the same time returning to a 
weak notion of truth in the sense expressed by Lessing and Mendelssohn: a truth that exists 
beyond the absolute knowledge of human beings, one that can only be aimed at but never 
possessed (Assmann 2008a, 145). 
 
It is at this point, with reference to a ‘weak notion of truth’, one made often in relation to a non-sovereign 
theology, and similar thus in many respects to other popularized theologies of today, that Assmann comes 
extremely close to restating some of the central principles behind the work of Walter Benjamin (Assmann 
2010, 48).  This is not a coincidence, I am here asserting, but rather an indicator of the continuum that can 
be established between the forces of the canonical and those of the messianic, as I have already outlined.   
The omission of Benjamin’s name here, and of his claims on behalf of a ‘weak messianic power’ 
that sought, in some sense at least, to overcome the violence of a universalized (‘sovereign’) reading of 
history, is somewhat surprising, especially given the fact that only a few pages earlier, Assmann 
developed his views on religious violence solely in reference to Benjamin’s essay ‘Critique of Violence’ 
(Benjamin 1996a).  There, Assmann sought to expand upon Benjamin’s polarized scheme of divine 
versus mythical violence in order to propose five different types of violence, culminating in a thoroughly 
re-worked definition of ‘religious violence’ given in relation to monotheism, and its canon, specifically 
(Assmann 2008a, 142f.).  As one might expect considering his work on the ‘Mosaic distinction’, 
Assmann inquires before answering: ‘What then is religious violence?  By this term I mean a kind of 
violence that stems from the distinction between friend and foe in a religious sense.  The religious 
meaning of this distinction rests on the distinction between true and false’ (144).  However, he is also 
careful to nuance his position now in ways that he had previously failed to do, and thus he states that there 
is yet an allegiance to religious truth which can yet be presented non-violently.  In this regard, Assmann 
admits at least this much:  
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 Cf. the readings of Schwartz in The Curse of Cain, as well as Smith in The Memoirs of God.  For Smith, this 
context is centrally fixed upon the similarities shared in the work of Assmann and Hendel.  Smith has since 
developed his critical interaction with Assmann more substantially in his God in Translation. 
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It has by now become imperative to dissociate religion from violence.  Violence belongs to the 
sphere of the political, and a religion that uses violence fails to fulfill its proper mission in this 
world and remains entangled in the sphere of the political.  The power of religion rests on 
nonviolence.  Only through a complete rejection of violence is monotheism able to fulfill its 
liberating mission of forming an alternative counterpower to the totalizing claims of the political 
(145).
9
 
 
Assmann is intending to sever the theological from the political, to divide the ‘theo-political’, in a sense 
to refute Carl Schmitt’s assertion that theological and the political are inextricably intertwined.  Yet, how 
distinct a religious violence that divides the world into a friend/enemy dichotomy could be from the realm 
of the political remains relatively unclear in his work, however, though he does little more than state that 
they are not identical (143).
10
  Thus, here, at the end of these essays, he concludes with a ‘weak’ 
conception of truth offered as a message of non-violence that echoes many themes running throughout 
Benjamin’s own work (perhaps best captured in his bid for a ‘bloodless’ violence (Derrida 2002)).  For 
Benjamin, indeed, this would be familiar terrain, especially as he concluded his oeuvre with his remarks 
‘On the Concept of History’ where a ‘weak messianic force’ is said to work, and which I will take up in 
the second half of this essay (Benjamin 2003).   
 In the context of Assmann’s conjectures, however, I am prone to ask: Can violence be so easily 
removed from the sphere of divine dealings with humanity?  Or, conversely, can it be (even if ideally) 
eradicated from what constitutes political interaction?  Though the logic of his claims is often fuzzy and 
thus subject to alleged misreading and misunderstandings on these matters, the train of thought that led 
Assmann to move from the history and usage of the canonical form to the ‘weak forces’ moving 
throughout history is a parallel motion of what Benjamin would pursue throughout his lifetime (though in 
a different manner to be sure), beginning with a focus upon these same messianic forces and moving 
toward the canonical, sacred scriptures in some sense.  As Brian Britt has pointed out, the sacred text was 
an implicit guiding thread throughout Benjamin’s entire career, despite his efforts at times to distance 
himself from its concrete traditions and religious practices (Britt 1996).  What Benjamin evidences, 
moreover, not only confirms Assmann’s basic intuitions (despite their possible shortcomings), but 
actually advances the fundamental connection between them much further, providing a clear ‘line of 
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 He subsequently adds the following: ‘Religious violence is nothing original, nothing necessarily implied in the idea 
of monotheism.  Monotheism originally meant the liberation of man from the omnipotence of political power.  This 
was at first conceivable only as counterviolence, religious violence against political violence.  Essentially this is a 
question not of violence against violence but of power against power.  The basic idea behind biblical monotheism is 
to erect a counterpower against the all-encompassing power of the political.  Religion can exert its counterpower 
against the political only if it has recourse to totally different means and values’ (145). 
10
 One could perhaps note the difficulty of this separation if viewed through the lens of Carl Schmitt’s formulation 
of a political theology, one wherein the nation-state is determined upon the friend/enemy distinction.  Assmann 
himself establishes his brief definition of political violence in relation to Schmitt, but does not develop it beyond a 
few terse lines.  See Schmitt, 1996.  This insight is made even more fortuitous considering Benjamin’s 
acknowledgement of Schmitt’s influence upon his own work in the Trauerspiel book.  Cf. Benjamin, 1998. 
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sight’ between the canonical and the messianic that does not in fact sever the political from the religious, 
in sharp contrast to what Assmann is here intending.  I will therefore attempt to elucidate this disjuncture 
more fully through a closer look at Benjamin’s reading of this ‘theo-political’ relationship of the 
canonical and the messianic. 
 
The messianic forces within canonical representations 
 
An inadvertent consequence of forming a canon is that any given canonical representation will 
eventually come to be challenged as hegemonic, even if they are ‘sealed’ (closed) as holy writ.  For open 
(literary, political, social or cultural) canons, an alteration to the canonical code may indeed be an easier 
task to accomplish, hence the historical insignificance of its ‘messianic elements’, for once they have 
rendered justice, they are easily discarded in favor of a new canonical formulation.  For closed ones, 
however, change only comes through a re-reading (re-interpreting) of the material already present, 
illuminating once again the dynamic tensions which are to be found within any canonical formation, be it 
either open or closed.  This would also serve to demonstrate why the messianic elements of a closed 
canon are thrust to the forefront and perceived as historically enduring: they must be constantly upon the 
horizon, or viewed as perceivable, if the closed canon is itself to be seen as worth continuing.  As one 
biblical scholar has noted, ‘The canon, then, does not lend itself to a definitive solution of the problem of 
religious authority.  The juxtaposition in it of law and prophecy suggests rather an unresolved tension, an 
unstable equilibrium’ (Blenkinsopp 1986, 151).  This ‘unresolved tension’ then is what ultimately opens 
canons up to their own internal, de-stablizing elements, ones that potentially challenge any hegemonic 
claims made on behalf of any given canonical formation (Santner 2000).  The canonical form, by 
definition it would seem, is torn from within by its own messianic elements of disruption, those which 
contest and challenge the ruling norms of a given canonical representation, albeit of historical, cultural, 
political or religious identification.  It might indeed be suggested that it was the (‘weak’) force of the 
messianic which led in this direction, toward the historical (and I would simply qualify ‘historical’ further 
with its descriptor, the ‘canonical’) image that so fascinated Walter Benjamin over the course of an all-
too-brief and trying career.   
The inclusion of Benjamin on this point will also hopefully become illustrative of Assmann’s 
recent, close proximity to him, a closeness which this essay argues is not a coincidence, but rather a 
natural outcome of a conceptual interaction.  In no uncertain terms, it unfolds as such: Assmann, in his 
early work on the canonical form, had neglected to account for this ‘messianic’ aspect of a religious 
canon.  Hence, as his later work will testify, he, on the one hand, starts from an analysis of the canonical 
form and slowly extends his study toward a logic of the messianic in order to clarify his claims, as we will 
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see in a moment.  Benjamin, on the other hand, starts from the ‘weak force’ of the messianic functioning 
in history only to later reach back toward canonical forms (even his earlier work on scripture and 
language), something in many ways he likewise could only point toward, or indicate as the direction in 
which his work tended on the whole.  It could perhaps also be said that it is no coincidence that 
Benjamin’s work was formed in the face of a dissolution of Jewish identity, a time when the meaning 
given to history by a canonical form would acquire a great deal of significance and perhaps meet its 
greatest challenge.  It was the crisis of Jewish identity within the experience of the early 20
th
 Century 
which would in fact drive Benjamin to consider the course of redemption in relation to history, and to 
reformulate some of the same insights which have driven Assmann’s work to date, as we will soon see. 
From this angle we are able to see how a messianism develops out of the cry for justice to be 
done to a people on the edge of being wiped clean from all cultural-canonical memory, a bid to instate 
themselves at the origins, or absent center, of history (Mosès 2009, 20f).11  This is in fact the direct route 
Assmann will pursue when he states that ‘History, or God’s interaction with humanity (or with his chosen 
people), is based upon justice.  The latter, in other words, appears to function as a generator of history’ 
(Assmann 2008a, 22).  The history, I would only add, that was set in motion and given meaning by a 
specific canonical intervention.  A rift is thereby also opened between polytheism and its ‘usurper’ 
monotheism, offering two distinct versions of history with two clearly incompatible visions of humanity’s 
relation to the divine.  For Assmann, a transformation is effected wherein ‘Historia divina, the stories told 
about the gods that reveal their personalities and vicissitudes, is turned into historia sacra, the story of the 
one God and his chosen people’ (27).  A ‘totally new conception of reality’ (27) was hence brought to life 
by the act of canonizing the sacred tradition of a people, and a ‘theologizing of history’ was to begin 
which would reach ‘its apogee with Biblical…historiography’ (26).   
 This juxtaposition of two different versions of history, the Judaic and the polytheistic/pagan, 
would not be something far removed from Benjamin’s own conceptualization of history.  Rather, he 
likewise came to see the distinction between a Judaic-biblical version of history and its pagan counterpart 
as at the roots of his own formulations of a historical dialectical materialism.  Indeed, as we shall see, this 
tension provided the opening through which the messianic could enter into his deliberations on the 
dialectical image and the justice yet to be accorded the ‘losers’ of history.  In this sense, Assmann’s work 
actually connects to Benjamin’s on this fundamental point, a connection that will otherwise serve to bring 
about a profound interrelation of the canonical and the messianic that has yet still to be fully realized. 
 
Walter Benjamin and the sacred text 
                                                 
11
 Cf. Mosès’ comments on Franz Rosenzweig’s attempt to do just this in the face of his particular cultural-historical 
context, one which Benjamin shared in to no small extent (Mosès 2009, 20f). 
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 Benjamin’s work has undergone a steady ingestion in the English-speaking world for some time 
now, though critical scholarship on his writings has gone through cycles of more or less prominence 
(Eagleton 1981; Buck-Morss 1991; Wolin 1994; Cohen 1996; Gilloch 1997; Caygill 1998; Weber 2008; 
Steinberg 1996; Benjamin 2005; Hanssen 2006).  And though his views on the ‘weak messianic forces’ 
moving through history have received numerous comments and applications, his views on scripture have 
remained far more muted (Britt 1996).  Any connection between the two, however, and as I here intend to 
posit, has remained entirely without mention.  By setting the stage thus, I will accordingly move through 
a close-reading of some of Benjamin’s fundamental texts concerning the role which the canonical form 
might have played in his work, rather than present a more general overview of his writings, as was more 
easily done in the work of Assmann, for example.  This will be the case, likewise, because the 
presentation of Benjamin I wish to let unfold is a more original interpretation of his work that will also 
hopefully serve as a unification of some of his most fragmentary writings. 
 Regarding the messianic, however, and here utilized in order to get our bearings within his corpus 
of diverse writing, it has become almost commonplace to demonstrate how Benjamin’s use of the term 
was not only a term directly adapted from its Jewish heritage, but also central to understanding the 
theological thematics of his work on the whole (Handelmann 1991; Jacobson 2003).
12
  Despite the 
frequent use of the concept in his work
13
, it was not until near the very end of his life that the term 
acquired the connotations for which it has subsequently been known.  In a difficult-to-date piece of 
writing appropriately labeled ‘Theological-Political Fragment’, Benjamin gave some initial flesh to his 
conceptualization of the term through his pronouncement that ‘Only the Messiah himself completes all 
history, in the sense that he alone redeems, completes, creates its relation to the messianic’ (Benjamin 
2002b, 305).  Conceived there as a counter-force to the secular idea of happiness, all of history is thereby 
charged with the messianic impulses which run like an electric current throughout its length, giving it its 
consequent shape and understanding, and this despite its apparent externality to it.   
 Though I will not here rework the numerous readings which his notion of the messianic has 
received, I will briefly outline the manner in which it functions.  In his series of theses ‘On the Concept of 
History’, Benjamin refers to a ‘secret agreement between past generations and the present one’, an 
agreement wherein a ‘weak messianic power’ holds a past claim on us, one that ‘cannot be settled 
cheaply’ (Benjamin 2003a, 390).  In essence, history contains a limitless series of images, of those 
                                                 
12
 In at least one case, his use of the messianic has also been explicitly linked to the (Christian) writings of Paul.  See 
Giorgio Agamben,’s The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans. 
13
 Cf. the use of the messianic throughout his work, including its sporadic, but essential references in Walter 
Benjamin, Selected Works.  See ‘The Life of Students’, vol. 1, 41; ‘Trauerspiel and Tragedy’, vol. 1, 55-6; ‘The 
Currently Effective Messianic Elements’, vol. 1, 213f; ‘The Idea of a Mystery’, vol. 2, 68; ‘Franz Kafka’, vol. 2, 
497; ‘Theological-Political Fragment’, vol. 3, 305-6; and, ‘On the Concept of History’, vol. 4, 389f. 
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marginalized (or ‘dangerous’) memories which hold the power to overthrow our present perceptions of 
the past, that is, our traditions as we have constituted them (391).  When these ‘dialectical images’ are 
thereby realized, the ‘objective’ (canonical) version of historical events is overthrown so to speak.  This 
counter-force (as a ‘tradition of the oppressed’) indeed shatters the illusion of the homogenous time of 
history, positing instead a ‘messianic arrest of happening’, what he otherwise calls ‘a revolutionary 
chance in the fight for the oppressed’ (396).  For the historian who can envision such a clash within 
historical normativity, there is only ‘a conception of the present as now-time [Jetztzeit] shot through with 
splinters of messianic time’ (397).  And if there was any doubt that Benjamin was here attempting to 
reformulate a predominantly Judaic term, he concludes his much celebrated theses with reference to the 
Jews who had first begun to see history ‘splintered’ in just such a fashion, past, present, and even future: 
indeed, for the Jews, we are told, ‘…every second was the small gateway in time through which the 
Messiah might enter’ (397). 
 In this radical re-conceptualization lies a profound critique of any historicist ‘objective’ approach 
to historical understanding, for there is no monolithic (‘homogenous’) time to which one can make 
unobjectionable reference.  As Benjamin was to formulate many times over in his Arcades Project, the 
historicist project, as the viewpoint of the ‘victors’ of history, was a bankrupt endeavor bound to be 
brought down (eventually, ultimately) by the ‘weak messianic forces’ latent beneath any contemporary 
understanding of historical events.  This reading of history would in fact give rise to Benjamin’s critique 
of, and departure from, Marx, for any reading of history that would consistently side with the oppressed 
of history, and hence over and against the oppressed when they become those holding political power, is 
one that would bring all ‘dialectics to a standstill’ (Fritsch 2005).  It is also an interpretation of history 
which will find many deep resonances with its Jewish reading, something captured only directly through 
the role of the Judaic scriptures in determining Jewish self-understanding.  For this reason, it becomes 
imperative to link Benjamin’s comments on the messianic, as the disrupters to any ‘objective’ historical 
record, to their Judaic origins in scripture, something which Benjamin himself contemplated from time to 
time, and which seems never to have vanished altogether from his horizons as we will now witness. 
For example, in a note written to himself on the back of a letter dated December 22, 1938, and as 
what was to be perhaps his last additions to the outline of his monumental Arcades Project (No. 25 in 
‘Materials for the Exposé of 1935’), Benjamin sketched some notes concerning the ‘ephemeral nature’ 
of the dialectical image, that revolutionary image of the oppressed which had been silenced from history.  
As a recurring central concept in his work, the dialectical image, or the always singular and yet entirely 
fluid result of bringing ‘dialectics to a standstill’, is here shown to be the object of history presented in 
contrast with the ‘fixity of the philological object’ (Benjamin 1999, 917).  Certainly not a ‘timeless truth’, 
as a universal approach to history might prefer, the dialectical image was a process of awakening to what 
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lies already singularly pronounced within history, not that which is caught up in a progression toward an 
historically immanent end or goal.  As he had already outlined among the cards preserved of the project, 
the image, in its legibility, in the ‘now-time’ (Jetztzeit) of its recognizability, is present in a singular sense 
at a particular time only; but this time, as with the relevant image it accompanies, changes for each epoch 
(462-4).  In this manner, it presents a unique portrait of what it means to do justice to history, from within 
history, and to seek the fulfillment of time as an infinite process that is ever-changing in each epoch, or 
for each age. 
It is also here that the theological motifs which saturate his work surface again most directly in 
accordance with his use of the ‘messianic’ as a ‘weak force’ working from within, to fulfill or redeem a 
history yet only presentable in a (renewed, or ‘more just’) canonical form.  Indeed, the weak messianic 
force is portrayed as a movement to make history theological in some sense, over and beyond its secular 
form as the ‘Theological-Political Fragment’ had hinted at, to posit history thus as an act of remembrance 
and as opposed to science:  
What science has “determined,” remembrance can modify.  Such mindfulness can make the 
incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the complete (suffering) into something 
incomplete.  That is theology; but in remembrance we have an experience that forbids us to 
conceive of history as fundamentally atheological, little as it may be granted us to try to write it 
with immediately theological concepts (Benjamin 1999, 471).   
 
Theology, again, must be veiled, or hidden, as the dwarf inside the puppet (to borrow the image of the 
‘magical’ chess-playing automaton from Benjamin’s theses on the concept of history), yet its essential 
importance is not reduced in the least.  Consequently, this is also why he is able to state that his thought is 
‘saturated’ with theology though his direct engagement with the discipline is often mute (471).  This is, of 
course, how we are also led to read the relationship between the puppet and that dwarf inside it who 
controls it, that is, between historical materialism and its ‘master’, theology, in the first of his theses on 
the concept of history (Benjamin 2003a, 389). 
 As Benjamin’s thought progresses toward the projected end of The Arcades Project, we find on 
the back of the same letter that the very next sentence reads, ‘Where the text is itself the absolute 
historical object—as in theology—it holds fast to the moment of extreme ephemerality in the character of 
a “revelation”’ (Benjamin 1999, 917).  This is, then, revelation seen as in some sense defined by its 
precarious placement at the ‘moment of extreme ephemerality’, and that presents itself only through the 
absolute historical object, here identified as the sacred text.  In this sense, history itself could be said to 
spring from the sacred text as it were, or, as he succinctly renders it immediately afterward, ‘The idea of a 
history of humanity as idea of the sacred text.  In fact, the history of humanity—as prophecy—has, at all 
times, been read out of the sacred text’ (917-8).  Just as Assmann was wont to link revelation and the 
sacred canon to the rise of cultural identity and history, so too does Benjamin seem to signal something in 
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this direction, though the intimations of this relationship are at this point vague and needing to be 
connected with the larger scope of his previous work.   
Here, though in rough fragmentary form, however, he contemplates what the next successive 
move might look like, what questions it would need to address in the context of the overall Arcades 
Project.  As he rather enigmatically penned it in direct sequence with the citations mentioned above: ‘The 
new and ever identical as the categories of historical semblance.—How stands the matter with regard to 
eternity?’.  Again, the semblance of history, as a universalized history which Benjamin opposed 
throughout his work to the messianic dialectical image, is brought into close relief against the backdrop of 
the sacred, or the eternal, and left there as if this juxtaposition alone were enough to properly guide our 
thoughts.  What seems to be clear, at least to Benjamin, however, as he ends this fragmentary note, is that 
the ‘dissolution of historical semblance must follow the same trajectory as the construction of the 
dialectical image’ (Benjamin 1999, 918).  That is, the justice wrought from the focusing of the dialectical 
image, the fulfillment potentially brought to history through its realization—which was for him a 
theological premise—must run counter to the universal history offered by a school of historicism itself 
too indebted to its hopes of becoming a science.  It’s reliance upon ‘historical semblance’, a realm of 
distorted, ideological (mis)readings of historical events, must be dissolved.  It is this school of historicist 
thought, in fact, which misses the fundamental relationship of identity construction that takes place in the 
continuum spanned between the messianic and the canonical.  In place of maintaining any tension 
between them, historicism would opt for a strict, and always becoming stricter, canonical reading of 
history, hence attempting to fully utilize the canon’s inherently ideological nature.  It is thus the sacred 
text, for Benjamin, from which history springs, what now, thanks to Assmann’s insight, we can say is the 
basic structure of the (monotheistic) canonical text in determining the meaning given to history. 
 We can trace this same line of thought elsewhere in Benjamin’s writings, especially in his work 
on language and translation where the biblical text becomes a model for a larger pattern of thought, one 
wherein the interlinear translation of the scriptures served as an exemplary form.
14
  As Benjamin 
succinctly renders it in his essay ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’, a title that alone 
bears witness to the split between the universal and particular with which history wrestles,  
If in what follows the nature of language is considered on the basis of the first chapter of Genesis, 
the object is neither biblical interpretation nor subjection of the Bible to objective consideration 
as revealed truth, but the discovery of what emerges of itself from the biblical text with regard to 
the nature of language; and the Bible is only initially indispensible for this purpose, because the 
present argument broadly follows it in presupposing language as an ultimate reality, perceptible 
only in its manifestation, inexplicable and mystical.  The Bible, in regarding itself as a revelation, 
must necessarily evolve the fundamental linguistic facts (Benjamin 1996b, 67). 
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 Cf. the conclusion to Benjamin’s essay ‘The Task of the Translator’, Selected Writings, vol. 1, 263. 
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The sacred text provides a unique insight, and point of departure, for viewing the ‘fundamental linguistic 
facts’ of our existence, and Benjamin seems content to leave this at face value.  We are led to believe then 
that the sacred text says something profound concerning the ‘fundamental linguistic facts’ of our 
existence and is therefore ‘only initially indispensible’ for discerning the structure of our linguistic 
existence.  Just as Assmann had pointed toward the significance of revelation within the act of 
canonization, Benjamin situates revelation in the linguistic being of humanity, something which the 
canonical form attempts to capture.  This is so for  
…the equation of mental and linguistic being is of great metaphysical moment to linguistic theory 
because it leads to the concept that has again and again, as if of its own accord, elevated itself to 
the center of linguistic philosophy and constituted its most intimate connection with the 
philosophy of religion.  This is the concept of revelation (Benjamin 1996b, 66).  
 
As, Giorgio Agamben, Benjamin’s Italian translator and editor, will later comment upon this fact, what is 
revealed, what appears as sacred, is the starting place of language itself, the very fact that language exists 
and which itself cannot be stated; this is the fact that religion aspires to present (Agamben 2000, 41; 
Agamben 1993).  The canon, in some sense, then, appears to be that form which most directly deals with 
the linguistic fact of our being, and which attempts to preserve that being in the face of a catastrophe that 
threatens to silence this precarious nature of existence.  Hence, a tight overlap is presented between 
canons and the particular national or ethnic language in which they are communicated. 
From this vantage point, we are able to see how Benjamin was in a sense always only working in 
the domain of history opened up by the processes of canonization, indeed articulating the forgotten 
byways of history in order to ‘blast’ away at their continuity and to reassert the messianic force of justice.  
His was a project directly indebted to the Judaic tradition’s inscription of meaning within history, a search 
for the origin of revelation which could not be conceived otherwise.  It was also an effort to conceive of 
the dialectical image as the seeker after origins lost to history, lost within history, within the originary 
canonical form and in great need of recovery if justice was, or is, ever to be performed.  This is to speak 
of origins which can perhaps only be touched, if ever so slightly, through the messianic elements within a 
particular canonical formulation, and this is perhaps also to see the messianic as the elusive origin, as the 
instance of what was in the beginning that could not ever fully be named or actually realized.  The affinity 
here between conceiving of the messianic elements as an elusive originary presence and the positing of 
the Christian messianic claims as those being a ‘Word’ situated, but not created, in the beginning should 
certainly not be overlooked in this regard.
15
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 For Assmann, this step toward marking the space of both the believer and the (subsequently formed) idolater, the 
step taken to distance the people of God from the world, was historically ‘reversed by Christianity with its theology 
of incarnation, thus clearing the way for a return to images, to the world, the book of nature, and ultimately…to 
natural science’ (Assmann, 2006a, 78).  In this manner, Assmann’s insight is not obscured by the disjunction offered 
here between Judaism and Christianity; indeed, the principle of incarnation presents itself as the pivotal distinction 
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In many ways, this recovery was always one concerning origins.  Indeed, Benjamin himself had 
only slowly begun to realize through the course of his work that the concept of ‘origin’ he had been 
dealing with in his book on the Origins of German Tragic Drama was the same central motif hidden deep 
within his voluminous Arcades Project (Cf. Benjamin 1998, 66f).  What he discovered was that both 
senses of origin had a profound religious heritage, a trajectory that in effect mirrors Assmann’s 
contentions that Judaism’s most fundamental insights were originally (pagan) Egyptian.  As Benjamin 
saw it, ‘Origin—it is, in effect, the concept of Ur-phenomenon extracted from the pagan context of nature 
and brought into the Jewish contexts of history.  Now, in my work on the arcades I am equally concerned 
with fathoming an origin’ (Benjamin 1999, 462).  The ‘Jewish contexts of history’ were not to fall away 
once being initially utilized either; they were to form the basis, in a sense, though remaining only 
structural perhaps throughout his work, of representing humanity’s encounter with the always particular 
historical catastrophe, giving this interaction a religious twist beyond simply evoking the almost routine 
questions of theodicy.  Catastrophe, in essence, was that which threatened to obscure or hide away forever 
the origins sought after. 
As he was to express in his Arcades Project concerning the nature of the historical phenomena in 
need of saving from oblivion,  
What are phenomena rescued from?  Not only, and not in the main, from the discredit and neglect 
into which they have fallen, but from the catastrophe represented very often by a certain strain in 
their dissemination, their “enshrinement as heritage.”—They are saved through the exhibition of 
the fissure within them.—There is a tradition that is catastrophe (Benjamin 1999, 473). 
 
Dealing with the essence of this ‘tradition that is catastrophe’, we might here assert, is the basis of the 
Judaic canon, center of the experience of Judaism and its ‘enshrinement as heritage’.  It was a tradition 
formed (canonized) in the face of catastrophe, a tradition that responded to catastrophe with the 
introduction of the canon into our world.  This would be, if Benjamin is here read correctly, as a second 
catastrophe equal to the first, the enshrinement of a heritage (as canon) that is itself catastrophic.  Yet it is 
also an enshrinement that would raise up its own internal messianic elements (the ‘fissure’ within) to 
disrupt its own ‘catastrophic’ attempts at canonization.  In no uncertain terms, this is why the messianic 
figures so prominently for Benjamin and yet it also might serve to explain why the (Judaic) canon was 
                                                                                                                                                             
between the two religions and is that which is yet also still bound to the canonical form.  Christian scripture, for its 
part, was likewise born in the face of an immanent catastrophe to its culture and tradition.  And the forces which 
could be said to guide the Judaic canon are no less relevant (from a structural level) for Chrstian practice and self-
understanding.  What should not be overlooked at this stage, then (as this will serve to unite Assmann’s claims most 
directly with those of Benjamin’s as we shall soon see), are the primary (dynamic) elements of the Judaic canon 
which yet still inform the basic definition of Christianity and which are not necessarily surpassed by any doctrine of 
incarnation: that is, its messianic impulse which can be derived directly from the formation and function of a 
monotheistic canon. 
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always kept at a distance, though never that far removed from him either, even if it was seen by him to be 
a catastrophe of some sort because it sought to ‘objectify’ history in a very concrete sense.   
Yet despite Benjamin’s critique of the canonical form, we might suggest that so profound was 
this act of canonization in the midst of historical crisis that the idea of meaning in history itself could be 
said to be born from this act, something which Benjamin had not yet abolished entirely from his thought.  
Indeed, it is something that cannot be banished from our understanding of history as such.  As the Jewish 
historian Yosef Yerushalmi has put it, ‘If Herodotus was the father of history, the fathers of meaning in 
history were the Jews’ (Yerushalmi 2005, 8).  And as Yerushalmi further makes clear, any attempt to 
counter the narrative strength of mythical recurrence runs straight through the terrain of, not to mention 
utilizes the tactics of signification indebted to, Judaism’s monotheistic, canonical processes.  As he so 
poignantly summarizes matters: after the canon was closed, the Jews stopped writing history (16).  And 
they stopped writing history because it now sprang solely from the canon itself.  But, and here is where it 
becomes impossible for Benjamin to take up the messianic and yet shed the canonical, there is yet another 
connection that Yerushalmi highlights and to which we must pay careful attention.  By his count, 
destruction and redemption are now forever dialectically linked together in the figure of the Messiah who 
is indissociable from the (canonical) representations of history, and thus, as the Talmud tells us, ‘On the 
day the Temple was destroyed the Messiah was born’ (23).  In other words, words central to this study, it 
was a catastrophe that forged the canon, and it was this same catastrophe which also formed the 
historically embedded conceptualization of the Messiah. 
If Yerushalmi is correct in asserting that Judaism managed to unite cyclical time, the time of 
ritual and liturgy, with an historical time, and without yet slipping into the realm of myth (Yerushalmi 
2005, 42), then Benjamin’s project certainly would appear to us as an attempt to sever cyclical time from 
historical time, to engage a ‘pure’ involvement of the messianic removed from the canonical, perhaps so 
strongly kept separate as a result of an intense grappling with the age in which he lived and worked, an 
age where particular ideological-canonical constructs where attempting to totalize (to make ‘completely 
objective’ in relation to history) a virulent racist and anti-semitic hatred.  In other words, Benjmain’s 
efforts could also be read as an attempt to save the meaning in history (its ‘theological’ element because 
external to historical events) while discarding the objective accuracy of history itself, something always 
bound to its potential misreading, bound in fact to be catastrophic in some sense.  This could also 
ultimately be the reason that Benjamin could never develop a form of ‘nonviolence’ (as Assmann will 
attempt to do), precisely because he realized the always ideological manner in which cultural-canonical 
representations operate. 
In his personal life, Benjamin faced the resurgence of another catastrophe so great as to nearly 
destroy the Jewish population of Europe, a crisis that indeed did bring immense devastation to the people 
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of history and the book, and in which his life story could only appear as emblematic (Friedländer 127f).  
He was dealing with the shattering of tradition, caught simultaneously in the midst of the modern forces 
of reason and a fascism bent on destruction.  In short, he was grappling with the upending of certain 
canonical forms of cultural memory and of history, upended by the forces of the messianic working from 
within and by external forces of destruction working from without…a time of crisis indeed.  It would 
seem in some sense almost justifiable that Benjamin came to rely so heavily upon a one-sided reading of 
the relationship between the messianic and the canonical, for it was the former which provided so much 
hope in the face of destruction, in the face of those nationalist, ideological-canonical readings which 
sought to perform a most perverse violence upon the ‘oppressed traditions’ of history. 
 
Toward forming the canonical in Benjamin 
 
So ultimately what place does the catastrophic canonical form hold in Benjamin’s estimation?  It 
would appear that the question to be put to Benjamin, based on what we have just seen, should in fact be: 
Can the canonical form be so easily dismissed after proving so ‘initially indispensible’?  I doubt that this 
is the case, even if Benjamin were to wish it so.  What we are witnessing is the appearance of the 
messianic as the logic of the canonical pushed to its edges, a project at the limits of intelligibility.  For as 
much as the messianic might appear to de-stabilize the norms of cultural and societal legibility, they still 
are operative within the domain of representations, in response to these representations and from within 
representation’s own limitations.16 
It was in fact those forces we saw only hinted at the end of the last section, those bent on 
destroying tradition (ultimately what we was to label as reason and fascism), which were to coincide most 
profoundly in Benjamin’s essay on ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility’, a 
combination that serves to illustrate most insightfully once again the close proximity which Benjamin’s 
work on the messianic maintains with the contours of the canonical, though without being stated 
explicitly by him as such.  From the outset, however, the essay itself ‘reproduces’ the problematic of the 
relationship between the canonical and the messianic which the present era, he says, will grapple with 
under the banners of ‘tradition’ and ‘authenticity’.  The terms are synonymous enough 
(canonical/tradition, messianic/authenticity) to reveal the deep structures at work here.  Indeed, the 
transformation from the one to the other runs straight through the Reformation and its attitudes toward the 
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 This insight was perhaps what inscribed itself in later twentieth century discourse under the name of 
deconstructionism.  Cf. the oeuvre of Jacques Derrida as the prime example of how messianicity operates at the 
limits of what can be represented ‘in the text’ (Derrida 1994). 
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canonical sacred text, illustrating Benjamin’s point with a decisive rigor, as I intend to demonstrate in 
what follows.   
The contrast between tradition and authenticity is central in fact to comprehending the way in 
which, according to Stéphane Mosès, aesthetics plays the mediator between theology and politics in 
Benjamin’s work (Mosès 2009, 66f).  This mediation essentially raises the stakes concerning the role 
which art has played, and continues to play, in the modern world.  As Benjamin lays it out before us,  
It might be stated as a general formula that the technology of reproduction detaches the 
reproduced object from the sphere of tradition.  By replicating the work many times over, it 
substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence.  And in permitting the reproduction to reach 
the recipient in his or her own situation, it actualizes that which is reproduced (Benjamin 2003b, 
254).   
 
Hence, we are confronted with the ‘power’ which reproduction holds over the identity of the people, a 
power which could be said to be generated from the technology itself.  Consequently, ‘These two 
processes lead to a massive upheaval in the domain of objects handed down from the past—a shattering 
of tradition which is the reverse side of the present crisis and renewal of humanity’ (254).  As this 
historical instance makes profoundly clearer, this ‘power’ of cultural reproduction, which I will here 
assert is distilled into its ‘purest’ technological form as a canon, is an external, selective and technological 
memory device born of a particular culture and tradition and yet capable of replicating those same 
formations over time.  And it is to this principle that Benjamin here turns his focus, and to which his 
thoughts return over and again, as I have already tried to demonstrate through his indirect reference to the 
canonical form.  To perceive the canon as the bulwark of societal representations, as well as the ‘purest’ 
form of cultural inscription and reproduction to have ever been invented, would not be a far stretch from 
his remarks here on the nature of technological forms.  Just such a declaration could very likely have been 
posted (albeit indirectly implied) along with Luther’s theses to the door of the church in Wittenberg, such 
was the tenacious allegiance to the canonical form (in this case, of scripture) pledged during the 
Reformation.  Indeed, for its part, the Reformation was, if seen in this light, a mass movement almost 
entirely indebted to the technological advancement of print, something not conceivable for the earlier 
‘vulgar’ translations of the bible (e.g. J. Wycliffe), and which was yet saturated entirely within an epoch 
given over to the ‘present crisis and renewal of humanity’.  Indeed, though Benjamin himself does not 
indicate as much, the ‘Protestant’ undertones present in his essay are often immediately discernable, as 
we shall see. 
Grasping the social significance of advancing technologies is, in Benjamin’s eyes, inconceivable 
without also fathoming the accompanying destructive ‘liquidation of the value of tradition in the cultural 
heritage’ (Benjamin 2003b, 254).  His project, thus, also acquires a significant gravity in relation to the 
catastrophic (‘destructive’) tradition that could be said to be the canonical.  The radicality of this 
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conjunctive trend is found within the realm of the aesthetic; art, especially in its ‘shock value’ form, can 
be said to destroy tradition.  This occurs as technology liberates art from its subservience to tradition, its 
foundation in ritual, from the fact that it was so thickly embedded in a tradition which granted it its use 
value.  Now, we are told, instead of being founded in ritual, art is founded on politics (256-7).  And, as 
Mosès again makes clear, this transition from the aesthetic paradigm to the political is yet in conjunction 
with a third, that of the theological (Mosès 2009, 66f).  As an external provider of meaning to the 
aesthetic, the theological is consequently linked to (albeit indirectly, and thus as ‘hidden’ within) the 
political.  It is accordingly the aesthetic paradigm which comes to mediate, in Benjamin’s later work, 
between the theological and the political, opening Benjamin’s remarks on art in this context to an overt 
theo-political reading.  In this sense, and as Benjamin would conclude, we are not ever really able to 
separate the theological from the aesthetic, or the aesthetic from the political. 
Benjamin’s separation of tradition and technology, however, is produced at the expense of the 
interwoven relationship between them, something which can be evidenced in the manner in which certain 
technologies could be said in fact to shape tradition itself.  Hence, our ability to see the Reformation as 
bound up with the technological triumph of the printing press which indeed shattered and still shatters 
tradition, leading to its tenacious allegiance to the canonical form alone (again, in this case biblical-
scriptural, as sola scriptura).  Though Benjamin is not dealing with the same scriptural-canonical form 
that the Protestant reformers were, he could almost point toward nothing less than the rise of something 
akin to ‘Protestant values’ when he states that ‘Literary competence is no longer founded on specialized 
higher education but on polytechnic training, and thus is common property’ (Benjamin 2003b, 262).  And 
it is in this way that tradition is continually upended by the reforming hands of technology, even a 
technology that extends a tradition over time, even a technology that is ‘catastrophic’ for tradition as it 
were.  It is in this sense that the canonical form itself becomes the focal point of these reflections between 
Benjamin and the Reformation despite their apparent, and very real, distance from each other.   
 Interestingly, and highly relevant for our study, in the second version of the essay, Benjamin 
included some speculations on the ‘eternal values’ of Greek art which were omitted from the final 
version.  In these remarks, the fixed ‘state of technology’ upon which the Greeks found themselves 
reliant, that is, the art of sculpture, was what compelled them to attach an ‘eternal value’ upon the work, 
one formed in contrast to the stamping process found in their work with coins, bronzes and pieces of terra 
cotta (Benjamin 2002b, 108f).  ‘This is corroborated’, we are told via Benjamin’s narration, ‘by the fact 
that for the Greeks, whose art depended on the production of eternal values, the pinnacle of all the arts 
was the form least capable of improvement—namely sculpture, whose products are literally all of a piece’ 
(109).  In stark contrast to this state of affairs, Benjamin sees his own age as bearing the marks of the 
beginning of film technology and the advent of a type of reproducible art which proved to have a high 
22 
 
‘capability for improvement’.  This state of things likewise ushered in a system of transient values, or a 
‘radical renunciation of eternal value’, leading him merely to conclude that ‘[i]n the age of the assembled 
artwork, the decline of sculpture is inevitable’ (109).   
What Benjamin leaves out of this contrast between fixed and transmutable art (an assessment 
which must not have set well with him for some reason in order to be occluded from the final version of 
the essay), is the contemplation of a form of technology which embodies the fluctuations between being 
capable of improvement and likewise not being so inclined, a technology which in fact frames its own 
content: that is, the canon, which, not only by being able to embrace both open and closed forms, but also 
through providing its own messianic de-stabilizing elements, is at once capable of being either, of being 
in-between the eternal and the transient nature of values, of being capable of embodying the very 
elements that would unseat its own sovereign reign.  And this is where Assmann’s main contribution to 
our study should return to the forefront of our thoughts, as the presentation of the canon, and not just any 
‘sacred text’, would be a fitting compliment to what Benjamin is perhaps trying to ascertain.  It is 
precisely in terms of this sliding scale between being capable and being incapable of improvement, 
between being open and being closed, or between the canonical rule and its messianic de-stabilization, 
that tradition receives the form of a canonized representation, and thus seems in some sense to clarify the 
problematic descriptions with which Benjamin was here wrestling.  It is a form, likewise, which finds the 
biblical-canonical version to be only initially indispensible, but then quickly expands to include all forms 
of cultural-canonical representation.  This is also perhaps to provide another justification for why he saw 
the need to read the historical object of dialectical materialism as embodied through sacred scripture, a 
form clearly not entirely free from attempting its own universalized history or its own ideological 
readings of the victors and losers of history.  In essence contradictory, he does seem to be discarding one 
myth for another, without his reasons for doing so being entirely clear (Boer 2007, 101f).  Yet there is a 
difference present in relation to history and to the potential for justice to be done, a difference which 
needs to be isolated and indeed clarified through its relation to the canonical form.  It is a difference 
discernable in terms of the canon’s relation to violence. 
 On this nexus between the canonical and violence, we find Assmann’s later determination to 
sever the bond between them as essential to remember, for a canon which would espouse such a 
dialectical materialism, as Benjamin had defined the messianic project, would be one that was (self-) 
aware of its relationship to violence, though perhaps not completely ‘nonviolent’ as Assmann might 
otherwise hope.  It would be a canon which harbored its messianic elements on the surface of its text and 
which offered a redemptive lesser-violence through this very feature of its existence.  It is therefore not 
surprising that Benjamin’s essay on art and technology points at its end toward violence on a grand scale, 
for ‘All efforts to aestheticize politics culminate in one point.  That point is war’ (Benjamin 2003b, 269).  
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The triad of aesthetics-politics-theology must kept functioning as a separate within the same economy, 
and not made to merge one into the other, even if one is occasionally ‘hidden’ within the other.   
The issue at stake here, and it is one which might perhaps help clarify the origin of the canonical 
form, is one of property relations (of land, of nationhood, of identity) and the technology (which is the 
canon) that is capable of preserving those ties between persons and their (right to a) dwelling throughout 
time.  As his citation of F. T. Marinetti makes clear, the modern ethos of war is one that attempts to 
‘immortalize’ the human being, to push humanity beyond itself in dominion over itself.17  This is the 
same impetus (though as an opposing force tending toward less violence) of what the Judaic canon was 
attempting to achieve.  This is to view the canonical form as a unique historical attempt to preserve the 
identity of a people pushed to the edges of extinction who yet wish to survive into the future.  As 
Benjamin tries to show, ‘Imperialist war is an uprising on the part of technology, which demands 
repayment in “human material” for the natural material society has denied it’, a process which could be as 
true for canons as for the ‘false sacrality’ of warfare and its myths (Benjamin 2003b, 270).  If society has 
denied a ‘natural human material’ from arising, something which may not actually exist as such, it is no 
surprise that Benjamin looked, or was beginning to look again at the end of his all-too-short career, to a 
canonical manifestation (the biblical-scriptures) in order to find an alternative route for overcoming the 
violence done through war, which itself is the most obvious example of how the ‘victors of history’ 
dominate when the messianic elements of representation are almost completely effaced from memory. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As some commentators on Benjamin’s work have noted, and as Assmann’s uniting of Benjamin, 
the canon and violence illustrates, Benjamin’s remarks on divine violence are not to be read in isolation 
from his comments on scripture (Fritsch 2005).  In so many words, this is to say that we cannot separate 
his views on divine violence from the forces that work through the canons of history and their 
accompanying messianic elements.  This link is indeed what enables us to utilize Benjamin’s work in 
order to form an account of what I would here term a ‘just canon’, a canon becoming conscious of its 
relationship to violence, something the Judaic canon, with its focus on the victims and marginalized 
figures of history, can be said to accomplish in some sense.
18
  Through this formulation, we might thus be 
able to see how in contrast to lawmaking which is always ‘powermaking’, ‘Justice is the principle of all 
divine endmaking…’, a reversal of the norms which have inspired political thought since its inception 
(Benjamin 1996a, 248). 
                                                 
17
 Benjamin’s citation of Marinetti is in fact given without reference. 
18
 Cf. Paul Ricoeur’s development of ‘happy memory’ in his Memory, History, Forgetting. 
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 In short form, the hypothesis of this essay develops as such: if there is a ‘messianic arrest of 
happening’ which is also a ‘revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed’, it interrupts (or ‘blasts’) 
the continuity of history presented in canonical form, but only truly more or less in accord with the degree 
to which the canonical representation unveils its own relationship to violence.  The less the canonical 
element does it, the louder must this ‘weak messianic force’ be sounded; the more the canonical element 
exposes its own proximity and propensity to violence in an effort to stem its tide, the quieter may the 
messianic forces grow (Derrida 2002).  Though Assmann might like to escape from an always violent 
‘matrix’ of cultural-canonical representations, Benjamin makes clear that this is neither desirable nor 
possible.  Rather, if canonical-representational identities are to be justly formed in our globalized age, 
then a deeper understanding of these forces at work is necessary, for those inside religious structures as 
much as for those external to them. 
 As both Assmann and Benjamin have pointed to with the entirety of their work, and by 
accounting for the convergences which are too uncanny to disregard, this would be to form an image of 
the canon that is able to preserve its nonviolent (or ‘less’ violent) heritage by resisting the temptations to 
universalize history as fact, to allow the voices of the oppressed to be guaranteed and heard, and to 
engage in a dialectical materialist vision of history even as it proclaims a sense of something transcendent 
to it.  For Benjamin, it was the sheer machinery of Nazi (ideological, canonical) representations that was 
so loud as to make it seem that only the ‘weak messianic forces’ of history were the ones capable of 
speaking a just word to humanity.  But, as Assmann’s progression from the canonical to the messianic has 
shown, and to avoid such catastrophic encounters in the future, a better understanding of the relationship 
between them must be sought, one which constantly seeks to enact ‘more just’ historical representations, 
ones never fully siding with either the oppressed (as Marxist-Communism was wont to do) or with the 
victors (as historicism attempted).  In this manner, perhaps a ‘hermeneutics of violence’ could be 
established between the canonical and the messianic elements of every historical representation in order 
to further the horizon of justice within which every identity is ultimately constructed. 
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